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2017 TÜV Rheinland FS Technician Trainer

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- FSM Manager
- FS Auditor
- Project Safety assessments and (Site) validation Assessor
- Functional Safety trainings
- Member of MT61508-1/2, MT61508-3 & MT61511
- Proof Test Consultancy





5TH EUROPEAN CONFERENCE 2025 ON PLANT & PROCESS SAFETY

16 & 17 DECEMBER 2025





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Yokogawa Europe B.V., The Netherlands

December, 2025

| Proof test Rev 1.0 | March, 2025 | © Yokogawa Electric Corporation

Agenda

- Proof test in IEC61511
- 2. Proof Test Project
 - I. Preparation Collection
 - II. Creation of Proof Test Dossiers
 - III. Execution of Proof Test
 - IV. Analysis of Proof Test Results
- 3. Results of some other Proof Test execution
- 4. Take away



IEC 61511-1:2016; Clause 16 SIS operation and maintenance

16.3.1 Proof testing

16.3.1.1 Periodic proof tests shall be conducted using a written procedure to reveal undetected

faults that prevent the SIS from operating in accordance with the SRS

16.3.1.2 The entire SIS shall be tested including the sensor(s), the logic solver and the final element(s) (e.g., shutdown valves and motors). NOTE Testing of the SIS can be performed either end-to-end or in segments (see 11.8.1).

Process pipe

Logic solver

Vent. Air

Transmitter

Sensors

Final elements

Safety Instrumented Function

Pipe to pipe

16.3.1.3 The schedule for the proof tests shall be according to the SRS.

The frequency of proof tests for a SIF shall be determined through

PFDavg or PFH calculation in accordance with 11.9 for the SIS as installed in the operating environment.

NOTE **Different parts of the SIS can require different test intervals,** for example, the logic solver can require a different test interval than the sensors or final elements

IEC 61511-1:2016; Clause 16 SIS operation and maintenance

16.3.1 Proof testing

- 16.3.1.4 Any deficiencies found during the proof testing shall be repaired in a safe and timely manner. A proof test **shall be repeated** after the repair is completed.
- 16.3.1.5 At some periodic interval (determined by the user), the frequency of testing shall be reevaluated based on various factors including historical test data, plant experience and hardware degradation.
- 16.3.1.6 Any change to the application program requires full validation and a proof test of any SIF impacted by the change. Exceptions to this are allowed if appropriate review and partial testing of changes are carried out to ensure the changes were designed per the updated safety requirements and correctly implemented.
- 16.3.1.7 Suitable management procedures shall be applied to review deferrals and prevent significant delay to proof testing.

What is Proof Test

A proof test means a complete test of the SIF.

The purpose of the proof test is to reveal all undetected failures that are present in the SIF

After the proof test the elements in the SIF should be in their initial state

SIF must be tested completely

Also allowed to split it in sensor, LS and final elements and test separately

Also allowed to use (false) trip as a proof test, if recorded that actions were successful.

Proof test does not mean only a functionality check confirming the (expected) function of the complete SIF or SIF input only!



BUT.....

What about:

16.3.2 Inspection

Each SIS shall be periodically visually inspected to ensure there are no unauthorized modifications and no observable deterioration (e.g., missing bolts or instrument covers, rusted brackets, open wires, broken conduits, broken heat tracing, and missing insulation).

NOTE These problems could indicate an increase in the frequency of faults.

And Documentation (Part of Proof Test Dossier)

16.3.3 Documentation of proof tests and inspection

The user shall maintain records that certify that proof tests and inspections were completed as required. These records shall include the following information as a minimum:

- a) description of the tests and inspections performed including identification of the test procedure used;
- b) dates of the tests and inspections;
- c) name of the person(s) who performed the tests and inspections;
- d) serial number or other unique identifier of the system tested (e.g., loop number, tag number, equipment number, and SIF number);
- e) results of the tests and inspection including the "as-found" condition, all faults found (including the failure mode) and the "as-left" condition.

Let's do Proof test!

Easier said then done

Client:

- Original HAZOP report is not available.
- SIL classification was done for this existing site based on the crosses (X) on the C&E.



After SIL Classification;

Proof testing is a KPI for the Facility Functional Safety compliance

But nothing available.

Start from Scratch



2. Proof Test Preparation: Project Scope


Site: Ethylene / Polyethylene Plant

Built in mid 90's

Ethylene
$$C_2H_4$$
 Plant - 157 SIF's 96 +1

96 +16 Selected during Site

SIL 0 - 3



Polyethylene $(C_2H_4)_n$ Plant – 52 SIF's 48 selected

Polyethylene

Note: > 40% of the SIF's are SIL 3 rated

2. Proof Test Preparation: Project Team

Project team: 1 Lead with 5 safety engineers

- 4 months preparing the 144 SIF proof test dossier.
- 4 weeks at site Actual Proof Test Execution

What is needed to Create this Proof test procedure &

Dossier?





- IEC-61511 Standard
- HSE UK crr428/2002 (OG54)
- Safety Manuals of each device in the SIF
 - Proof test procedure/methodology devices
 - Proof Test coverage of each device
- Application logic and settings/Parameters
- P&ID
- Datasheets






Principles for proof testing of safety instrumented systems in the chemical industry

Prepared by **ABB Ltd** for the Health and Safety Executive

contract research report 428/2002

- IEC-61508/61511 Standards
- HSE UK crr02428
- Safety Manuals of all devices in the SIF
 - Proof test procedure/methodology of the devices
 - Proof Test coverage of these devices
- Application logic and settings/Parameters
- P&ID
- Datasheets



2. Proof test Preparation: Proof Test Methodology & Coverage

Transmitters

				1
Testing method	Tools required	Expected outcome	Remarks	
Functional test: 1. Follow all Management of Change procedures to bypass logic solvers if necessary. 2. Execute HART/BRAIN command to send value to high alarm (21.6 mA) and verify that current has reached this level. 3. Execute HART/BRAIN command to send value to low alarm (3.6 mA) and verify that current has reached this level. 4. Restore logic solvers operation and verify.	Handheld terminal	Proof Test Coverage =52%	The output needs to be monitored to assure that the transmitter communicates the correct signal.	
Perform three point calibration along with the functional test listed above.	Handheld terminal Calibrated pressure source	Proof Test Coverage =99%		

PTC test sequence A 5)	88 %		•
PTC test sequence B 6)	34 %	38 %	
CTC test sequence C 7)	-	88 %	

- This value takes into account range types relevant to the runction of the electronic components according to Siemens SN29500.
- During this time, all diagnostic functions on the dat least once
- Time Leween error detection and error response.
- Step response time as per DIN EN 61298-2.
- Proof test coverage when the level is approached, or when the sensor is removed and the tines are immersed in a medium of similar density and viscosity.
- Proof test coverage when simulation is performed on the Nivotester by activating the test button.
- Proof test coverage when checking the switch point under reference operating conditions.

6.2 Full Stroke Test

The "Full Stroke Test" ("On-line") must be performed to satisfy the PFDAVG (average probability of failure on demand) value.

The full test frequencies will be defined from the final integrator, in relation to the defined SIL level to achieve.

Procedure:

- Operate the Actuator/Valve assembly for an open/close complete cycle, with complete opening - closing of the valve.
- Verify the Correct performing of open close manoeuvre (e.g. check locally, or automatically, via Logic solver, the correct movement of the actuator/valve).

Full Stroke Test procedure, the "Test Coverage" can be considered 99%.

Valve / Actuator Assembly

Proof Test Coverage (PTC) / Diagnostic Coverage (DC)

Considering the application of the above described Test procedule, the "Test Coverage", in case of automatic procedure, can be considered > 99% (it will be lower in case of imperfection/incompleteness of the test procedure and/or use of not calibrated/adequate equipment).

In case of manual procedure the Test Coverage" shall take into account also the test imperfection and the reliability/competence of the operator.



2. Proof test Preparation: Proof Test Methodology & Coverage

Valve (PTC?)

6.2 Full Stroke + Leak Test

The "Full Stroke + Leak Test" ("On line") must be performed to satisfy the PFD_{AVG} (average probability of failure on demand) value.

The test frequencies shall be defined from the final integrator in relation to the defined SIL grade to achieve.

Procedure for Full Stroke Test

- Operate the Actuator/Valve assembly for No. 2 open/close complete cycles with complete closing of the valve.
- Verify the correct performing of open close manoeuvre (e.g. check locally, or automatically via Logic solver, the correct movement of the actuator/valve).

The achievement of the safe position (open or closed) shall be confirmed with the control of:

- The OPEN/CLOSED indications on actuator and the relative feedback to the logic solver, if existing. (see the specific actuator operating manual for details)
- The mechanical position indicator on actuator and/or valves, if existing; (see the specific actuator operating manual and/or the valve assembly drawing for details)

Procedure for Leak Test On Line

The Valve assembly shall be operated in order to reach the closed position.

(The closed position shall be verified and confirmed as described above).

Then, the pressure value shall be checked using the manometers or automatic system installed on line, upstream of the valve: the absence of the seat eakage shall be confirmed by any pressure loss.

With the available plant facilities, the seat leal age can also be measured downstream of the valve and read by the logic solver.

No Proof Test Coverage What to choose?

SOV

Mode of Operation		Low Demand	
Proof Test Coverage	PTC	92 %	
Partial Stroke Test Coverage	PSTC	70 %	

SOV (PTC?)

3.2.1 Suggested Proof Test

The suggested proof test consists of a full stroke of the final element actuator and valve. It is assumed that the BXS valve is able to perform the safety function properly if the final element reaches the safety state within the specified safety time.

Step Action

- 1 Bypass the safety function and take appropriate action to avoid a false trip
- 2 De-energise the BXS Valve to force the actuator and valve to the fail-safe state and confirm that the safe state was achieved and within the correct time.
- 3 Return the BXS valve to the energised state and inspect the final element for any leaks, visible damage or contamination and confirm that the normal operating state was achieved.
- 4 Remove the bypass otherwise restore normal operation.


Proof Test is not a Diagnostic Test ...

PTC # DC


90%? or.....




- IEC-61508/61511 Standards
- HSE UK crr02428
- Safety Manuals of each device in the SIF
 - Proof test procedure/methodology devices
 - Proof Test coverage of each device
- Functional Logic Diagrams and/or C&E and/or safety narratives and (any) settings/Parameters
- P&ID
- Datasheets



- IEC-61508/61511 Standards
- HSE UK crr02428
- Safety Manuals of each device in
 - Proof test procedure/methodol
 - Proof Test coverage of each d€
- Application logic and settings/Par
- P&ID's
- Datasheets



- IEC-61508/61511 Standards
- HSE UK crr02428
- Safety Manuals of each device in the SIF
 - Proof test procedure/methodology devices
 - Proof Test coverage of each device
- Application logic and settings/Parameters
- P&ID
- Datasheets:
 Sensors, Final Elements





2. II. Creation of Proof Test Dossier

What is needed for the Proof test Procedure?

- First check (Inspection): Basic Preparation, Visual Inspection and Spare parts
- Combine all SIF devices proof test procedures in 1 comprehensive SIF proof test procedure

Also include all possible application functions to reveal undetected faults, e.g.:

- Out of range behavior
- MOS/Interlock behavior
- di/dt behavior / Rate of rise behavior
- Voting (1002 / 2002/ 2003/ 2004 /1003)
- Line fault behavior
- HH/LL trip(s)

- Hysteresis behavior
- Input Discrepancy Behavior
- Hart settings for Smart equipment
- Cybersecurity (Smart Devices: Write protect)
- Valve position (and/or other) feedback requirements. Leak test requirements

Result:

Simple SIF 1001 (I/O) app. 20-25 steps Actual test takes app. 1 -1.5 hour Complex SIF 2003 (I)/1002 (O) app. 40-60 steps Actual test takes app. 3 - 4 hours

2. II. Pressure Transmitter Low Test (1001); Yokogawa EJX Pressure transmitter.

Step	Pressure Transmitter Test (1001) Sequence	OK					
1.	JHA completed.						
	Valid PERMIT TO WORK available.						
2.	Inform Technician(s) in the field which pressure transmitter and valves are to be						
	tested.						
3.	Verify Mechanical Integrity pressure transmitter & Valves.						
	Refer to calibration test report results.						
4.	Follow end-user bypass procedures to bypass the RS logic solvers.						
	Pressure transmitter ready to be proof tested with handheld terminal						
5.	Parameter settings verification:						
	Burnout direction switch: Output to 21.6 mA upon detection of internal Failure. Write protection Switch: Enabled						
6.	Execute HART/BRAIN command to send value to high alarm (21.5 mA /109.4%) and verify that current has reached this level.						
-	Verify transmitter Fault (High) alarm at 21mA/106.3%) in SIS and DCS Verify transmitter Fault (High) alarm at 21mA/106.3% in SIS and DCS Verify transmitter Fault (High) alarm at 21mA/106.3% in SIS and DCS						
7.	Execute HART/BRAIN command to send value to low alarm (3.6 mA/2.5%) and						
	verify that current has reached this level.						
8.	Verify transmitter Fault (Low) alarm at 3.8mA/-1.25%) in SIS and DCS Partner PS 1- in advance acception and available. PS 1- in advance acception and available.						
٥.	Restore RS logic solvers operation and verify.						
	Note: Point 5-8 provides a transmitter proof test coverage of 52%.						
9.	Remove the bypass and confirm pressure transmitter is operational.						
10.	Re-confirm with the Technician(s) in the field which pressure transmitter and						
	which valves are to be tested.						
11.	Tural at a three Turansian Trians						
11.	Isolate the Impulse Lines, Slowly open the Vent Valve to allow the pressure to fall SLOWLY.						
12.	The Low (Low) process alarm (1st point calibration) will be initiated.						
	Record the Field value reading (via Handheld terminal)						
	Record the SIS reading.						
	Verify Annunciator alarm on SIS and DCS (& SOE recorder)						
	7 (11)						
13.	Continue to allow pressure to fall until the Low Low (Low) process trip (2nd point						
	calibration) is initiated.						
	 Record the Field value reading (via Handheld terminal) 						
	 Record the SIS reading. 						
	 Record the time of initiation. 						
	 Verify the Trip alarm on SIS and DCS (& SOE recorder) 						

Step	Pressure Transmitter Test (1001) Sequence	OK
14.	Check that the valve(s) (XV, FV and/or PV) have tripped closed in accordance with	
	the Interlock Diagrams.	
	 Verify the for XV's the limit switch ZSC is activated. 	
	Record the time of valve closure	
15.	Check and record the zero reading of the transmitter at process pressure (3rd point	
	calibration).	
	If the error is more than 2% (EJX Safety Accuracy) then the test has Failed.	
	Note: Point 6-8, 12, 13 and 15 provides a transmitter proof test coverage of 99%.	
16.	Recommission the pressure transmitter.	
17.	When process conditions are stable reset the trip via the SD reset button	
17.	when process conditions are stable reset the trip via the 5D reset outlon	
18.	Check that the annunciator & Trip alarms returned to a healthy condition.	
4.0	70	
19.	If any part of the system failed to operate correctly or if the reading did not	
	correspond with the required (on the P&ID) annunciator or trip <u>setting</u> then the test has failed.	
	Check each item of the loop.	
	Repair and re-test where necessary.	
	If extensive repair has to be carried out then a punchlist will be created and the end-	
	user will be informed.	
20.	Check that process conditions and annuciation(s) have returned to normal.	
	Ensure valves are return to normal.	
21.	Inform Technician(s) in the field that testing is completed	
22.	End of Pressure Transmitter Test (lool) Sequence	

2. II. Creation of Proof Test Dossier

Appendices for the used Documents (Mark up to show proof test results)

- SIL report Particular SIF
- P&ID
- Interlock Logic Diagram (FLD's)
- Loop drawings
- Termination Diagrams
- Application Logic printout
- Punch item record
- SIL Calculation
- Proof Test Check sheet (Inspection)
- Data sheets of all Equipment
- Safety Manuals of all equipment

Appendix I Punch List Proof Test Number of pages that follow: 1 Appendix II Proof Test Check Sheet F-101 SIF PSLLL-101-7 Number of pages that follow: 1 Appendix III Reliability Calculation PSLLL-101-7 SIF 30 Number of pages that follow: 3 Appendix IV IPF Report F-101 Safety Function Classification Sheet Number of pages that follow: 1 Appendix V P&ID Cracking Heater Absorbed Duty F-101 Number of pages that follow: 2 Appendix VI Interlock Logic Diagram Number of pages that follow: 1 Appendix VII Loop Drawings F-101 SIF 30 Number of pages that follow: 10 Appendix VIII Termination Drawings Number of pages that follow: 3 Appendix IX Application Logic (Furnace) Number of pages that follow: 4

	Plant ID :			Unit :	HIPPS				1
									ı
	SIF Function :	To prevent High pressur	e transfer to shore						ı
	Test Date and Time :			Tag Number :	PIT-0520A/B/C - CG-810				ı
TOP SECT	Tested by :			Authorised by :		PL PL	eason if NOT passed	:	1
IOI OLOI	Witnessed by :			Overall Test result:	PASS FAIL				l
		Proof Test Procedure			FAIL NA Date:	_			ı
					PAIL NA. DIRE.				1
	SIF architecture drawing SIF SE: PIT-0520A/B/C	(or reference to (loop)d	rawings, logic drawin	igs etc.):					1
	SIF FE: CG-810 1. P&ID : TBA								١,
	2. Loopdrawing SE: TBA								ı
Plant ID	Loopdrawing FE: TBA Technical Datashouse	Pressure Transmitter Re	-0						ı
riant ib	5. SHI HN2118 FSRU H	PPS Project Logic Wiring	Drawings: 10.141.02	0_100LG Rev 2					ı
	SHI HN2118 FSRU H Instruction for Operation	IPPS Project Termination on and Maintenance: 10.	Drawings: 10.141.020 141.020 IOM Rev 1.0	_100TW Rev 2					ı
	SIF hardware description								1
				Sensor Eler					1
	Sensor PIT-0520A	Make / Device Yokogawa Pressure	Serial Number	Type EJXX30A-ED97N- 00CDL/XJ02MH1/T08/D3	Range 1 0-150 BarG	Trip Setting	Proof Test	Result Pass Fail	ı
		Transmitter		GDCDL/KLD2M/16/T08/D3	o localid	113 886			ı
SIF Function	Input Interface SPD-BAI-01	MTL Surge Protector		SD32X	N/A N/A		YES NO	Pass Fail	ı
	BAI-01	P+F Al Isolator		KPD2-STC4-EX1	NA NA			Pass Fait	ı
	Logic Solver Input	SLS Module		Rack Slot. Channel	an an				ı
	PAHH-0520A	Al-517-81		0202.01/02	4-20mA		YES NO	Pass Fail	ı
				Sensor Eler	mort				1
	Sensor DIT-05205	Make / Device Yokogawa Pressure	Serial Number	Type EXXXXA-EDS7N-	Range 1 0-150 RarG	Trip Setting	Proof Test	Result	1
T 1 D-1 1 T'-		Transmitter		OPCOL/KLD2MHs/TORIOS	0-150 BarG	115 BarG	YES_ NO _	Pass Fail	ı
Test Date and Tir	Input Interface SPD-BAI-02	MTL Surge Protector		SD32X	NA NA		VEST NOT	Pass Fait	l
	BAI-02	P+F Al Isolator		KPD2-STC4-EX1	NA NA			Pass Fall	l
	Logic Solver Input	SLS Module		Node, Slot, Channel	NA NA				l
	PAHH-0520B	Al-517-B1		0203.01/02	4-20mA		YES NO	Pass Fait	ı
Tested by				Sensor Eler	mort				í
rested by	Sensor	Make / Device Yokogawa Pressure	Serial Number	Type EDXXXA-EDS7N-		Trip Setting	Proof Test	Result	1
	PIT-0520C	Transmitter		COCOL/KLO2MHs/Tok/Os	0-150 BarG	115 BarG	YES NO _	Pass Fail	ı
	Input Interface SPD-BAI-03	MTL Surge Protector		SD32X	NA NA			Pass Fail	ı
	SPU-DAI-US BALUS	DaP Al landstor		SEGUENT STOAPEN				Pass Fall	ı
Witnessed by	Loois Solver Input	SLS Module		Node, Slot, Channel	NA NA				ı
With Cooca by	PAHH-0520C	Al-517-B1		Node, Slot, Channel 0204.01/02	4-20mA		YES NO	Pass Fait	ı
				Logic Sol	har.				1
	Logic solver modules	SLS module	Serial Number	Node, Slot, Channel			Proof Test	Result	1
	Transmitter trip 2003 logic	PM-552-03 PM-557-00		0214.01/02/03	->>	>>	YES NO NO	Pass Fail Pass Fail	ı
Test Procedure	2003 logic Reset Function	PM-556-00 PM-557-00		0217.01	\approx	\leq	YES NO	Pass Fail Pass	ı
	Neset Function	PM-557-00		0216.04 Final Element I		=	TES NO	Pass Pas	1
	Logic Solver Output	SLS Module	Serial Number	Node, Slot, Channel	пентасе		Proof Test	Result	1
	SOV-CG810A	PO-526-02		0221.02	$>\!\!<\!\!>$	\sim	YES NO	Pass Fail	Ι.
	Output Interface	Make / Device		Туре					
	BDO-01	P+F DO Isolator		KFD2-RCI-Ex1	>>>			Pass Fait	
	SPD-800-01 SOV-810A	MTL Surge Protector ACSO Solomoid Value		5D32X 5315A	\sim	>		Pass Fail Pass Fail	
				Final Element I	riterface	$\overline{}$		rest [rad [ł
	Logic Solver Output	SLS Module	Serial Number	Node, Slot, Channel		_	Proof Test	Result	1
	SOV-CG810B	PO-526-02		0221.02	\rightarrow	\sim	YES NO	Pass Fail	
	Output Interface	Make / Device		Туре					
	8DO-02 SPD-8DO-02	P+F DO Isolator MTL Surge Protector		KPD2-RCI-(Ex)1 SD32X		\sim		Pass Fait Pass Fait	
	SPD-800-02 SQV-8108	MTL Surge Protector ACSO Solomoid Value		5D32X 5315A	\sim	>	YES NO	Pass Fail	
				Final Elem	tent	$\overline{}$			ł
	Actuator / Valve	Make	Serial number	т	уре		Proof Test	Result	1
	Actuator	BFFI		ALGAS 145-5400-735	SCL	\sim	YES NO	Pass Fail	

tID :			Unit : Hi	PPS								
Function :	To prevent High pressure	transfer to shore										
	tate and Time : Tag Number : PIT-6520A/BIG - CG-810											
Laste and Time :					110							
			SIF Trip values and 8	SIF timing								
neor : PIT-0528A					ļ							
Trip values	P&ID trip value	Field value	Logic Solver value	Remarks	ŀ							
Maintenance	- Occasido:											
	YES NO	N/A										
SUCCESSION.		mn										
			SIF Trip values and S	SIF timing								
nsor : PIT-0528B					ļ							
Trip values	P&ID trip value	Field value	Logic Solver value	Remarks	ļ							
***			1									
Maintenance		NA			l							
Successful:	YES NO	NIA										
			SIF Trip values and 8	SIF timing								
neor : PIT-0529C												
Trip values	P&ID trip value	Field value	Logic Solver value	Remarks	I							
W.												
Maintenance												
Successful:	YES NO	NA										
			SIF Trip values and S	SIF timing								
al element: SOV-810A			Additional Comments:									
Proof test times	(hh:mm:sa)	Remarks	1									
or trip at time			I									
element response			1									
response time												
process saf. time			1									
difference												
			SIF Trip values and 8	SIF timing								
al element: SOV-810B			Additional Comments:									
Proof test times	(bh:mm:sa)	Remarks	1									
ortrip at time			1									
element response		i	1									
response time		Ì										
process saf. time		İ										
difference		t e	1									

	FAIL	
N.A.	Date:_	

YOKOGAWA 🔸

Page 1 of 3 CH6

CHECK SHEET HIPPS PROOF TEST

Appendix: Proof test Check Sheet

SIF Hardware components Sensor configuration

SIF hardware descript	ion (make, type, voting, c	hannel, position e	tc.)				
			Sensor Eleme	nt			
Sensor	Device	Make	Туре	Range	Trip Setting	Proof Test	Result
PIT-0520A	PRESSURE TX	YOKOGAWA	EJX 530A			YES NO	Pass Fail
Input Interface	Device	Make	Туре				
SPD-BAI-01	SURGE PROTECTOR	MTL	SD32X	N/A	N/A	YES NO	Pass Fail
BAI-01	AI BARRIER	P&F	KFD2-STC4-EX1	N/A	N/A	YES NO	Pass Fail
Logic Solver Input	SLS Module	Make	Rack, Slot, Channel				
PAHH-0520A	AI-517-B1	YOKOGAWA	TBA			YES NO	Pass Fail
i .							

SIF hardware description	IF hardware description (make, type, voting, channel, position etc.)											
Sensor Element												
Sensor	Device	Serial Number PT	Туре	Range	Trip Setting	Proof Test	Result					
27-PT-1501A	EJX530A		GAUGE	0-110 bar	102 barg	YES NO	Pass Fail					
Input Interface	Device	Make	Туре									
N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A			YES NO	Pass Fail					
Logic Solver Input	RS Module	Serial Number RS	Node, Slot, Channel	ı								
27-PT-1501A	SAI143-H53		N01S01C01	Tag name27PT1501A		YES NO	Pass Fail					

Appendix: Proof test Check Sheet

SIF Hardware components logic solver

Programmable Logic Solver (PE)

			Logic Solver		
Controller	RS module	Serial Number RS	Node, Slot	Proof Test	Result
SCS0101	S2CP471-01	1	N01S09, N01S10	YES NO	Pass Fail
		·	·	 	•

Solid state Logic Solver (E)

	Logic Solver									
Logic solver modules	SLS module	Serial Number	Node, Slot, Channel		Proof Test	Result				
Transmitter trip	FM-552-03		0214.01/02/03		YES NO	Pass Fail				
2003 logic	FM-557-00		0216.01/02/03		YES NO	Pass Fail				
2003 logic	FM-556-00		0217.01		YES NO	Pass Fail				
Reset Function	FM-557-00		0216.04		YES NO	Pass Fail				

Appendix: Proof test Check Sheet

SIF Hardware components Final Element Configuration


1	•				1
			Final Element		
Logic Solver Output	RS Module	Serial Number RS	Node, Slot, Channel	Proof Test Result	t
_27HY080A	SDV531-L53		N01S03C01	YES NO Pass	Fail 🗌
_27HY080B	SDV531-L53		N01S03C02	YES NO Pass	Fail ☐
Output Interface	Device	Make	Туре		
27-EV-080	Solonoid Valve	BIFOLD	FP05	YES NO Pass] Fail ☐
27-EV-080	Actuator	Servovalve	RSOM 6000/160S	YES NO Pass	Fail 🗌
Valve	Device	Serial Number	Туре		
27-EV-080	Ball Valve		T3 Type 18"	YES NO Pass] Fail ☐
Logic Solver Output	RS Module	Serial Number RS	Node, Slot, Channel	Proof Test Resul	t
_27HY081A	SDV531-L53		N01S03C04	YES NO Pass	Fail ☐
_27HY081B	SDV531-L53		N01S03C05	YES NO Pass	Fail 🗌
Output Interface	Device	Make	Туре		
27-EV-081	Solonoid valve	BIFOLD	FP05	YES NO Pass] Fail ☐
27-EV-081	Actuator	Servovalve	RSOM 6000/160S	YES NO Pass	Fail 🗌
Valve	Device	Serial Number	Туре		
27-EV-081	Ball Valve		T3 Type 18"	YES NO Pass	Fail ☐

SIF Trip Values and SIF response time Timing

			SIF Trip values and SIF timing		
Sensor : PIT-0520C					
Trip values	P&ID trip value	Field value	Logic Solver value	Remarks	
"0"					
Maintenance	e Override:				
Successful:	YES NO	N/A			
			SIF Trip values and SI	F timing	
Final element: SOV-810A			Additional Comments:		
Proof test times	(hh:mm:ss)	Remarks			
Sensor trip at time					
Final element response					
SIF response time					
P&ID process saf. time					
Time difference					

2. III. Proof Test: Execution at Site

What proof test scope is possible?



Proof testing of PT101-10 & PT101-2

HOW?

Only a block valve (no bleed).

Proof test options:

- Remove Transmitter to test wetted part Or
- No disconnection Use HART Communicator

What about the Note:

14. SETTINGS TO BE CONFIRMED BASED ON BURNER TEST.

2. III. Proof Test: Execution at Site

What proof test scope is possible?

Proof testing of PT-979A/B/C

How?


Manifold Block / Bleed valve

Proof test options:

- Calibrated Pressure source Or
- No pressure source available HART Communicator

What about Proof Test possibilities for

- in-line Flow transmitters,
- Level Switches/transmitters,
- Temperature transmitters



2. III. Proof Test: Execution at Site; Proof Test limitations


Testing the sensors and final elements was done in different ways:

- Via simulation (HART) the Sensor output side (only HART PTC can be claimed)
- Via simulation on the sensor input side (maximum PTC can be claimed)
- Via Jumpers on the sensor output (at device terminals) side (PTC claim??)
- Via Calibration field equipment (e.g. for TT) and the HART simulation in the field
 (maximum PTC can be claimed)
- The simulations on the sensor input side are mainly done by using HART, instead of actual field simulation, as requested by client.
- Final elements partly included due to the parallel valve overhaul activities/Time constrain.
 Resulted in limited valve testing (PTC claim??)
- Proof Test Scope to be recorded as part of the auditable trail: Against what design basis the SIF
 was tested (e,g. filled in procedures, revision, and completeness) is recorded, incl. limitations

2. III. Proof Test: Execution at Site

Recording of the results

Application logic Printscreen.



2. III. Proof Test: Execution at Site

Recording of the results

- Application Logic Print screen.
- BPCS HMI Graphics / Face Plates.
- Complete check sheet records with field equipment data.

In addition, other records collected (when available)

- Sequence of Even Recorder @ SIS and / or BPCS
- Alarm Management system (Hardwired based / Software based)
- Other systems (e.g. PI-server)
 and
- Maybe pictures (Dated): Visual inspection
 Proof of activation.



2. IV. Proof Test results: Independent Stgae 4 FS Assessment

What is done:

Operation and maintenance
Clause 16
Stage 4

- Verify all SIF's which are proof tested.
- Any assessment limitations and the safety impact analysed.
- Verify Proof test coverage affects PFDavg calculation and next proof test interval
- Verify Document basis for Proof test
- Proof Test Engineering process with the Verification/Validation checks
- Actual equipment installed and failure data used.
 - Sensors, 3rd party interfaces, Logic Solver Final element Configuration.

2. IV. Proof Test results: Independent Stage 4 FS Assessment


What is done:

Operation and maintenance
Clause 16
Stage 4

- Actual proof test records verification
 - General assessment and assessment by area
 - Proof test results
- Completed the FSM for Operation and Maintenance Phase checklist; How good/bad is client FSM
- Final Assessment of this proof test project 199 open items for the SIF's mainly Systematic issues and many SIF's did not meet SIL 3 (Mostly Financial SIL)
- SIF Re- Calculation based on actual PTC;
 Still meets SIL or Recommend new proof test period to meet SIL.

3. Results of recent Proof Test Execution

Independent Stage 4 FS Assessment





Project 2: Proof Test deficiencies for improvement

- 1. Provide Safety Requirement Specification based on a Hazard and Risk Analysis. See IEC61511 Ed 2, Part 1 chapter 10.3 for SRS requirements.
- 2. Include basis of design and other operational documents as part of the Proof Test results to verify if the assumptions done with respect to expected demand/Failure rate of the system and documentation are still matching. E.g. (false) trip evidence over the past period.
- 3. Specify and Inspect the installed hardware components against the components of the original specification.
- 4. Specify the proof test intervals and process safety times on which the PFDavg calculations are based.
- 5. Compare the current proof test results with the latest proof test results to detect behavioral changes and/or trends.

Project 2: Proof Test deficiencies for improvement

- 6.Consider process trips as proof tests and document them accordingly. These to be noted with the proof test results for comparison purposes.
- 7. Overall Loop response time of 2.7 and 2 seconds, respectively.
- Valves closing times are recorded and show closing within this response time, but the transmitter and logic solver response time has not been recorded.
- As such no conclusion can be made if the overall Loop Response Time meet the Process Safety time for the 5 HIPPS system (Trains).
- 8. Proof test shows that the valves closed on the high trip but no conclusion can be made that all undetected faults that prevent the HIPPS from operating in accordance with the SRS are fulfilled. Valve proof test requirements are not available.
- Specify a detailed proof test to meet the IEC61511 Ed 2, Part 1 chapter 16.3.1 requirements

Project 3: FSM Deficiencies in Proof Test Report

ltem	Issue	IEC61511 Ed. 2 Pt.1Clause
1	The document front sheet with names of author, reviewers, approvers, revision etc. is missing.	19.2.6 / 7 / 8
	There is no review, approval and control scheme applied. Table of Contents does not match the report order, format and pages.	
2	Report indicates no information on achieving and maintaining functional safety of the SIS.	19.2.9
3	The Recommendation for improvements & observations are referred to	16.3.2 /
	appendices but no information is provided. Therefore, it is unclear what is the	16.3.1.3 /
	conclusion	16.3.1.6
4	Some "major" observations are not supported/elaborated by the report. As such there there is no design/operational basis for these observations	16.3.2 / 19.2.9
5	There is no analysis to justify the claim that the installed equipment are still within	16.3.1.6
	the useful lifetime.	16.3.2
6	No information provided on the SRS and Design documents.	19.2 / 16.3.1.6



Project 3: FSM Deficiencies in Proof Test Report

Item	Issue	IEC61511 Ed. 2 Pt.1 Clause
9	Prerequisite for proof test has not been defined.	16.3.1.1. / 19.2
8	The used (Calibrated) test equipment for Proof Test is not recorded.	16.2.2
9	No information on end-user responsibility for proof testing.	16.3.1.1/
		16.3.1.5
10	No schedule information on proof test.	16.3.1.3
11	Punch list form incl impact Analysis is not available.	16.3.1.4 /
		16.3.1.6
12	No project information is available on the HIPPS itself.	16.3.3 /
		19.2.29
13	Signature missing of the recorded and involved (customer) persons.	16.3.3
14	System drawings not available at site.	16.3.3 / 19.2.9
15	Visual inspection not based on any drawings and lacking references. Items cannot be	16.3.3
	confirmed as done. Actual measuring points are unclear and not documented.	
	No measurements provided as proof that it is ok.	
16	Visual inspection of field equipment is not recorded.	16.3.2

Project 3: FSM Deficiencies in Proof Test Report

Item	Issue	IEC61511 Ed. 2 Pt.1 Clause
17	Unclear how application logic is checked. Not covered in the proof test procedure.	16.3.1.1/ 16.3.3
18	Chapter name is Annual test and set on 1 year, but the project Safety Validation Plan specifies 18 months. There is no record to show that this time interval is maintained since the last record in 2018.	16.3.1.3 / 16.3.1.5
19	Proof test table: This proof test procedure is severely incomplete and lacking any test to reveal undetected faults. It is just a limited function check.	
	A SIF 2003 Transmitters and 1002 Valves must be tested for every possible functionality and identify failures and possible common cause issues. Further the Proof Test Coverage is not defined.	19.2.9
	No Datasheet and Loop test check sheet of the installed equipment is provided.	
20	No punch form with impact analysis provided. Punch items overview is incomplete and not matching the punch items recorded.	16.3.1.4 / 16.3.1.6

4. Key Take Aways

- Proof test "Buzz word" Easier said then done.
- Proof test is to detect dangerous undetected failures in the SIF.
- Good proof testing require a detailed planning, proper documentation, manpower, time and budget.
- Proof test during TA schedule is limited due to time constrain and many parallel activities/pressure to complete on time.
- Inspection is required as part of Proof Test

4. Key Take Aways

- The Proof Test Coverage can be a serious limitation which can result in additional Proof testing to meet the SIF SIL requirement.
- FSM in the Operational Phase is mostly not established No Systematic
 Capability (SC) for the Operator of the Facility
- Analyze Proof test results limited follow up due to budget/time/ knowledge constrain
- Most of the verification process is still a manual (Human) activity. Still Limited possibilities to improve this process with digitalization.



Terimah Kasih (Thank you)

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