


# AI-based Automated HAZOP (MetA-HAZOP)

*Marius Bächle (CSE Institut) – 5th European Congress on Plant & Process Safety*



CSE-Engineering Center of Safety Excellence GmbH

[info@cse-engineering.de](mailto:info@cse-engineering.de)




# Ammonia Refrigeration Plant

- Storage of fresh and processed food
- Normal and Low Temperature Cooling stage
- Refrigerant Charge of 15 t Ammonia



# Ammonia Refrigeration Plant




# HAZOP for the Ammonia Refrigeration Plant




- 20 hours in multiple HAZOP sessions
- 5–6 experts required
- High personnel costs
- Delays due to absence of team members
- Results depend on team experience



# Automated HAZOP for the Refrigeration Plant



- Safety-related knowledge of the plant




- Digital representation of the plant



- Algorithms to identify hazardous scenarios

# Required Knowledge for automated HAZOPs

## Scenario Elements



The diagram illustrates the flow of knowledge for automated HAZOPs. It features a table with five columns: Deviation, Cause, Consequences, Risk Assessment (subdivided into L, S, R), and Countermeasures. A blue box highlights 'Valve V034 / V036 unintentionally closed (human error)' in the Cause column, with a blue arrow pointing to 'Plant and Component Data'. A red box highlights 'Ammonia' in the Consequences column, with a red arrow pointing to 'Substance'. An orange box highlights 'F0 S1 B' in the Risk Assessment column, with an orange arrow pointing to 'Risk Assessment'. Green curved arrows at the top indicate a sequential flow from left to right across the table columns.



Deviation	Cause	Consequences	L	S	R	Countermeasures
No Flow	Valve V034 / V036 unintentionally closed (human error)	Overheating of Pump P200, Failure Sealing, Release of Ammonia	F0	S1	B	Valve secured in open position

**Plant and Component Data**      **Substance**      **Risk Assessment**

## ■ Knowledge Representation with Ontologies


# Knowledge Representation with Ontologies

## ■ Ontologies: Describing the Pump P200 from a Safety Perspective



# Knowledge Representation with Ontologies


- Ontologies: Describing the Plant from a Safety Perspective
- Modelling Equipment with Classes and Relations






# Knowledge Representation with Ontologies

- Ontologies: Describing the Plant from a Safety Perspective
- Modelling Equipment with Classes and Relations




# Knowledge Representation with Ontologies


## ■ Modelling the elements HAZOP scenarios with Classes and Relations



# Automated HAZOP for the Refrigeration Plant



- Safety-related knowledge of the plant




- Digital representation of the plant




- Algorithms to identify hazardous scenarios

# Digitalizing the P&ID of the Refrigeration Plant



# Digitalizing the P&ID of the Refrigeration Plant


## ■ Representing the Ammonia Refrigeration Plant as Graph






# Digitalizing the P&ID of the Refrigeration Plant


## ■ Specifying the safety-relevant Attributes of each Node




# Automated HAZOP for the Refrigeration Plant



- Safety-related knowledge of the plant





- Digital representation of the plant



- Algorithms to identify hazardous scenarios

# Equipment-based Analysis

- Equipment-based Analysis: Each Component is analyzed separately



## Querying the Knowledge Representation

**Deviation**  
No Flow



**Cause**  
Outlet Valve Closed




**Consequence**  
Overheating of Pump



**Safeguard**  
Valve Locked Open

# Plant-based Analysis

- Plant-based Analysis: Analyzing Interactions between Components
- Propagation Strategy depends on plant Topology



**Deviation:** No Flow  
**Cause:** Failure of Pump P200



**Consequence**  
No Cooling Capacity in Evaporator

## Querying the Knowledge Representation

# Generating Automated HAZOP





# Automated HAZOP for Refrigeration Plant

		Deviation	Cause	Consequences	Risk Class	Countermeasure
1	P200	No Flow	Operational Error – Closed Outlet Valve	Overheating – Failure of the pump – Leakage	B	No Flow Alarm, Valve Locked Open
		Deviation	Cause	Consequences	Risk Class	Countermeasure
31	V200	High Pressure	Failure in Compressor Control Unit	Exceeding MAWP – Loss of Containment	B	High Pressure Switch


- **Completeness:** Safety relevant Scenarios found
- **Relevance:** Avoidance of redundant Scenarios
- **Reliability:** Reproducibility of Scenarios given by deterministic Method
- **Proved in further case studies:** Hexane Storage Plant, Water Separator System

# Automated HAZOP for Refrigeration Plant

- Increased complexity
- Deterministic Approach
  - » Limited capability to handle novel or incomplete situations
  - » No interpreting of unstructured text data

## Combining knowledge-based Approach with Large Language Models




- Retrieving relevant Knowledge
- Interpreting Knowledge with LLM
- Generating HAZOP



# Combining Knowledge Based Approach and Large Language Models

## Prompt

Identify the hazardous scenarios for the Ammonia Refrigeration Pump.




Hazardous Event									
Hazardous Event	Severity	Frequency	Consequence	Control Measures	Residual Risk	Initial Risk	Control Measures	Residual Risk	Initial Risk
Effluent flow from tank and tank	Low	Low	Effluent spill, causing contamination, fire or explosion	Effluent spill, causing contamination, fire or explosion	Low	High	Effluent spill, causing contamination, fire or explosion	Low	High
Effluent flow from tank and tank	Low	Low	Effluent spill, causing contamination, fire or explosion	Effluent spill, causing contamination, fire or explosion	Low	High	Effluent spill, causing contamination, fire or explosion	Low	High
Effluent flow from tank and tank	Low	Low	Effluent spill, causing contamination, fire or explosion	Effluent spill, causing contamination, fire or explosion	Low	High	Effluent spill, causing contamination, fire or explosion	Low	High
Effluent flow from tank and tank	Low	Low	Effluent spill, causing contamination, fire or explosion	Effluent spill, causing contamination, fire or explosion	Low	High	Effluent spill, causing contamination, fire or explosion	Low	High
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Effluent flow from tank and tank	Low	Low	Effluent spill, causing contamination, fire or explosion	Effluent spill, causing contamination, fire or explosion	Low	High	Effluent spill, causing contamination, fire or explosion	Low	High
Effluent flow from tank and tank	Low	Low	Effluent spill, causing contamination, fire or explosion	Effluent spill, causing contamination, fire or explosion	Low	High	Effluent spill, causing contamination, fire or explosion	Low	High
Effluent flow from tank and tank	Low	Low	Effluent spill, causing contamination, fire or explosion	Effluent spill, causing contamination, fire or explosion	Low	High	Effluent spill, causing contamination, fire or explosion	Low	High

# Combining Knowledge Based Approach and Large Language Models


## Combining knowledge representation with Large Language Models

- Better handling of new or incomplete situations
- Retrieving relevant parts of the knowledge representation instead of fixed queries
- Interpreting of text-based descriptions



# Summery

- Deterministic method to automate HAZOPs
- Knowledge Representation with Ontologies
- Two-Stage Scenario Identification
  - » Equipment-based Analysis
  - » Plant-based Analysis
- Proven in various case studies
- Combining Knowledge-based Approach with Large Language Models



**Marius Bächle**

CSE Center of Safety Excellence gGmbH  
marius.baechle@institut.de  
0721 4706 8124

Project Partner





RESEARCH AND INNOVATION IN PROCESS AND PLANT SAFETY

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