Process Safety after a Merger

How to come together in a joint culture

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Introduction

Wassila Benaïssa

- Chemical Engineer & Doctor –
 INPToulouse France
- 8 years Chemical Hazards Specialist & Lab Manager – INERIS, Paris
- 4 years Process Safety Engineer and Lab Manager – Solvay, Lyon
- 5 years Process Safety Expert dsm– firmenich, Geneva



Pier-Jan Hettema

- Chemical Engineering –TU Eindhoven
- 14 years operations Dupont, Shin-Etsu
- 5+ years consultant in Reliability Engineering and Process Safety
- 11 years Global Process Safety Expert –
 ADM, dsm-firmenich
- EPSC Board member since 2021






DSM

1902

DSM (Dutch State Mines) is founded in the Netherlands





Firmenich

1895


Philippe Chuit, a
visionary scientist, and
businessman Martin
Naef create a perfumery
start-up in the garage
of Charles Firmenich in
Geneva, Switzerland.





May 9, 2023









Innovators in nutrition, health and beauty



Perfumery & Beauty



Taste, Texture & Health



Health, Nutrition & Care



Animal Nutrition & Health

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Three dynamic markets, two iconic names, one foundational purpose

dsm-firmenich: we bring progress to life We're a trusted partner to global companies operating in high-growth and resilient markets. We're innovators in nutrition, health, and beauty

~30,000

passionate, talented, and diverse people in our global team 150+ years

of combined scientific discovery and innovation heritage

€12+ bn

combined revenue

Different process safety cultures

DSM


- State -> Stock owned
- Historic fatal incidents
- Industrial best practise
- Corporate PS standards
- Global competences
- Strong safety network
- Mandatory risk reduction
- Strict verification & validation of safeguards


Firmenich

- Privately owned
- No history of fatal incidents
- Compliance driven
- No corporate PS standards
- External consultants
- Small safety network
- ALARP
- No specific verification & validation process

Safety is a priority

Bringing everything together








Focus on the combined Risk determination

DSM

- Risk graph
- Based on IEC 61511
- Order of magnitude reductions
- Conditional modifiers
- Only 1 reversable injury consquence
- Focus on more severe fatal injury
- Determine Risk Level without safeguards




Firmenich

- Risk matrix
- 5x5
- Order of magnitude reductions
- Conditional modifiers
- 3 reversable injury consequences
- Focus on smaller injury categories
- Residual risk including safeguards.

		Consequence Severity				
		5 - Negligible (< 10K CHF)	4 - Low (10K- 100K CHF)	3 - Moderate (100K - 1M CHF)	2 - Significant (1M - 10M CHF)	1- Catastrophic (> 10M CHF)
	A – Frequent (1 per yr.)	п	П	1	1	1
poc	B – Occasional (once in 10 yrs.)	ш	Ш	Ш	1	1
Likelihood	C – Infrequent (once in 100 yrs.)	Ш	Ш	=	=	1
	D – Improbable (once in 1000 yrs.) (10 ³)	ш	ш	Ш	=	П
	E – Highly Improbable (once in 10,000 yrs.) (10 ⁴)	ш	ш	=	ш	П



Legacy DSM Risk Graph




C = consequence

F = Presence


P = Avoidance/Flee

W = Probability

a, 1, 2, 3, 4, b = Risk without safeguards



IEC 61511



Environmental risk graph

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Legacy Firmenich risk matrix

		Consequence Severity				
		5 - Negligible (< 10K CHF)	4 - Low (10K- 100K CHF)	3 - Moderate (100K - 1M CHF)	2 - Significant (1M - 10M CHF)	1- Catastrophic (> 10M CHF)
	A – Frequent (1 per yr.)	П	Ш	1	1	1
poo	B – Occasional (once in 10 yrs.)	ш	Ш	Ш	1	T.
Likelihood	C – Infrequent (once in 100 yrs.)	ш	Ш	Ш	=	1
	D – Improbable (once in 1000 yrs.) (10 ³)	ш	ш	ш	=	П
	E – Highly Improbable (once in 10,000 yrs.) (10 ⁴)	ш	ш	ш	ш	Ш

Approach


- Consequence severity should be assessed on the basis of maximum credible worst case (i.e., maximum nominal inventory or energy that could be released), without benefit of active safeguards*. Passive safeguards** may be assumed to work.
- Likelihood should be assessed on the basis of the entire scenario occurring, not just the cause, and should take credit for active and passive safeguards. Likelihood should be based on operating history, within and outside company, and available failure rate data.
- The Likelihood level of E should be assigned sparingly e.g., if all safeguards (procedures, training, hardware, mechanical integrity, administrative) including good engineering practice are in place and of high quality.
- Active Safeguards: Control measures that require energy or human action at some point to function properly. Examples: Procedures, interlocks, emergency shut-off valves, pressure relief devices, sprinklers, mechanical ventilation.
- Passive Safeguards: Control measures that do not require energy or human action to function. Examples: such as secondary containment, fire walls, vessel design pressure, natural ventilation.

		Potential Financial		
Level	Descriptor	Impact (CHF)	Examples of Losses On-Site	Examples of Losses - Off-Site
1	Catastrophic	> 10M	One or more Fatalities Large spills and releases Property damage Business interruption	Fatality or multiple severe injuries Large scale evacuation Major property damage Major environmental impact
2	Significant	1M - 10M	One or more severe permanent injuries Significant spills and releases Property damage Business interruption	- 1 or 2 LTC injuries - Evacuation; shelter-in-place - Significant property damage - Environmental impact
3	Moderate	100K - 1M	1 or 2 serious injuries (Lost Time Case) Multiple Medical Treatment cases Medium spills and releases Property damage & business interruption	1 or 2 First Aid injuries Property damage Minor environmental impact
4	Low	10K - 100K	- 1 or 2 Medical Treatment cases - Multiple (~10) First Aid cases - Small spill or release - Property damage & business interruption	Nuisance impact (odors, noise, traffic, etc.)
5	Negligible	< 10K	- 1 or 2 First Aid cases - Fully contained spill - Release remains onsite - Property damage & business interruption	- No discernible impact



Proposed future Risk Matrix - Risk Graph

					Safety consequence				
					Reversible injury		Irreversible injury		
				Minor	Medium	Medium	Serious	Catastrophic	
	5		Cs1		Cs2	Cs3			
			5	4	3	2	1		
Likelyhood of the initial failure	L3	Α	High initial failure	а	1	2	3	4	
	L2	В	Default	Tolerable	a	1	2	3	
	L1	С	Low intitial failure	Tolerable	Tolerable	a	1	2	
		D		Tolerable	Tolerable	Tolerable	0	1	
		Е		Tolerable	Tolerable	Tolerable	Tolerable	a	
	<u> </u>				Ce1	Ce2	Ce3	Ce4	
					Environmental/reputation*/financial*				
	How to apply the risk matrix?			matrix?	Terminology		Presence (F)	Escape (P)	
	Determine the initial risk by consequence and intial failure likelihood Then apply F and/or P reduction to determine the Risk Level			by consequence and	Conditional modifiers	F, P (max 2 reductions)	F1<10%	P1 - Possible	
				uction to determine the	Likelihood	L, L2 = default	F2 - Frequent	P2 - Not Possible	
				action to determine the	Consequence	Cs, Ce			



Conclusions

- Get to know each other takes time (people, work habits, processes)
- Aligning the ambition level
- Pull vs. Push strategy
- Different demand and hazard profile in 4 BU's
- Cultural changes takes years...





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