

# Improving Safety Systems with better risk assessment and digital tool

Arnoldi Davide  
Principal Safety Consultant



#safetygoesdigital



# About Me



## Davide Arnoldi

Principal Safety Consultant



- 17 years of experience in Functional Safety
- Certification as FSEngineer TUV Rheinland and Expert by UL
- Facilitator for H&R STUDIES (HAZID/HAZOP/C-HAZOP/FTA)
- Facilitator for SIL determination (LOPA/Risk Graph)
- Expert in SIS design in various fields (Oil & Gas, Petrochemical, Power, Pharma, etc.)
- Trainer for Functional Safety courses

# HIMA Group Today

Independent  
**Family  
Business**  
in 4th Generation

**1050**  
Employees

**Global footprint**  
520 Country units with  
local Sales, Engineering and  
Service

**Safety DNA**  
Technology Leader  
Functional Safety

Protection from  
**People Assets  
and  
Environment**

Quality  
**Management  
Germany**


Customer  
**Process Industry  
Industry**

**50,000** systems  
installed worldwide  
(SIL 3/SIL 4)

**1.150.000.000** EUR  
Sales 2023

# Agenda

- 1** Importance of H&R and SIL determination
- 2** Experience teaches... Real cases
- 3** Information management, the HIMA digital revolution
- 4** Conclusions




---

# Importance of H&R and SIL determination


---

# IEC61511 target




SIS Lifecycle, IEC 61511

# H&R and SIL determination





# Causes of major accidents



Out of control: Why control systems go wrong and how to prevent failure?  
(2<sup>nd</sup> edition, source: © Health & Safety Executive HSE - UK)





---

**Experiences teaches... real cases**


---

# HAZOP "evergreen"

DEVIATION	CAUSES	EFFECTS	S	F	Risk	PROTECTIONS	S	F	Risk
Less pressure	Failure pump P92 functioning ?	No water flow to SR91. Reduction in SR91 cooling efficiency. SR91 meltdown	4	4	H	LSL 90703 detects low level in steam drum (SD91) and initiates shutdown FIT 90602 detects low flow with operator intervention, low low flow initiates shutdown	1	2	L
	Manual valve HV 90609 in pump P92 suction closed	No water flow to SR91. Reduction in SR91 cooling efficiency. SR91 meltdown	4	4	H	LSL 90703 detects low level in steam drum (SD91) and initiates shutdown FIT 90602 detects low flow with operator intervention, low low flow initiates shutdown	1	2	L
	Manual valve HV 90613 in pump P92 discharged closed or automatic valve XV90603 closed by error ?	No water flow to SR91. Reduction in SR91 cooling efficiency. SR91 meltdown	4	4	H	LSL 90703 detects low level in steam drum (SD91) and initiates shutdown FIT 90602 detects low flow with operator intervention, low low flow initiates shutdown	1	2	L
	PCV 90701 failure (totally opened), reduced pressure in steam drum	Steam drum depressurization, the evaporation is at 100 °C, losses of water, pressure and thermal stress of the coil in the steam generator with possible damage	4	4	H	1. PIT 90701 on steam drum initiates SD for LL alarm TIT 90702 on steam drum LSL 90703	1	2	L

- Incomplete information in the definitions of causes and effects
- Incorrect assessment of risk reduction
- The risk is always mitigated but incorrectly
- HAZOP development on Excell sheet – stand alone data

# HAZOP "evergreen" - result



As per HAZOP no SIS required!!  
(but in reality, the risk remains!)

Initiator Event	Event Frequency	Conditioning modifier	Prob.	Naked risk	TF	IPL	PFD	Freq reached	SIL
Failure of P-0130	0.1	Only 10% of the time an operator is present	0.04	0.004	0.01	when flow at FIT-30101 is less than set point stop reactor using the emergency shutdown (SD) This is a SIL-1 interlock.	0.1	0.0004	1

- Incorrect LOPA methodology
- SIF not defined
- LOPA development on Excell sheet – stand alone data

# LOPA (restudied)

Let's see the result without considering the SIF inserted.

Initiator Event	Event Frequency	Conditioning modifier	Prob.	Naked risk	TF	IPL	PFD	Freq reached	SIL
Failure of P-0130	0.1	Only 10% of the time an operator is present	0.04	0.004	0.001	NO	0	0.004	NO

In this case the SIF was not necessary and therefore:

- ■ We could have saved on engineering hours;
- ■ We could save on the quantities and characteristics of the devices to be purchased;
- ■ We could save on installation, commissioning, maintenance and test;

The result of the Hazard & Risk and SIL determination assessments defines the size of the SIS.

**From this point it is always difficult to go back!**



---


# Information management, the HIMA digital revolution

---


# Application Lifecycle IEC61511

IEC 61511 emphasizes that information as Input and Output in all steps of the life cycle must be:


- **Free from any ambiguity**
- **Clear**
- **Traceable**
- **Precise**
- **Verifiable**




# Setting a FS Management System is Complex



# Complexity increases the gap...




# Digitalization = simplify







# SLM: "The Only Source of Truth"



The use of a modular tool such as SLM allows you to digitally manage the life cycle of the FS, reducing systematic errors due to information transfers between the various steps.

**In this way, SIFs requirements are always traceable and available over time!**

# Consulting & Service & Engineering Activities



Source: overall IEC 61511 lifecycle model

---

# Conclusions

---

H&R and SIL determination are two fundamental steps for SIS design

Performing H&R and SIL determination correctly allows you to define SIFs appropriately for the associated risk

Using a digital tool such as SLM allows you to track the life of the SIF, always keeping the requirements available

HIMA consulting as a single point of reference for the development of SIS projects including digitalization of the FS management

# Contacts



Davide Arnoldi  
Principal Safety Consultant

M +39 366 574 7985  
davide.arnoldi@hima.com  
www.hima.com

