

# Use of generic major accident scenarios for process safety management



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# The « Perfect » PHA Study as Input for Process Safety Management

Before starting the PHA (=core of process safety)

- **Back to basics**: the design is performed according to good practices and recognized **industry standards**
- A review of **experience information feedback** information is performed to include the lessons learned in the design
- **Inherent Safe Design principles** were applied as much as possible

During risk assessment (= verification step)

- All risks of all installations are assessed, and all risks comply with company acceptance criteria
  - ✓ All **hazards and risks** are identified: there are no unknowns!
  - ✓ All possible **causes** leading to undesired events (loss of containment,...) are identified
  - ✓ All possible **scenarios and consequences** are evaluated
  - ✓ All **impact** on people , environment and assets are known
  - ✓ All preventive and mitigating **barriers** are listed

# Process Safety Improvement Plan



Step 1  
Identify

Step 2  
Action plan



Step 3  
Promotion



Step 4  
Close the gap

Mature processes for PHA are existing in TotalEnergies...


But we want to get better...major accidents are not an option...

# Step 1: Creation of a Major Risk Register

- Creation of central register with all major accident scenarios (**Major Risk Register**)
- The Major Risk Register includes all **major accident scenarios** with catastrophic and disastrous consequence potential in the TotalEnergies risk matrix
- The Major Risk Register is discussed periodically at board level of the company to **increase transparency**



Action plan required



## Catastrophic

- People : 2 - 5 fatalities
- Extensive pollution on ecosystems of recognized interest
- Assets : 10 - 100 M€


## Disastrous

- People : > 5 fatalities
- Massive pollution with lasting consequences on vast ecosystems of interest
- Assets : > 100 M€



# Step 1: Creation of a Major Risk Register

- A **benchmark** study was performed (Q2 2018) of major accident scenarios reported by different sites for the same type of units in the Refining & Chemicals branch in TotalEnergies
- The table below gives a summary for some **refinery and polymer** units



Number of G4+G5 scenarios	SITE 1	SITE 2	SITE 3	SITE 4	SITE 5	SITE 6	SITE 7	SITE 8
FCC	33	NA	<b>0</b>	44	396	ongoing	<b>17</b>	6
Distillation	21	139	130	72	109	ongoing	<b>7</b>	31
Naphtacracker	100 (2)	<b>50</b>	NA	NA	659	NA	NA	NA
Reformer+DHT	57	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	62	20	56	24	19
HDS units	23 (4 units)	0 (3 units)	17 (2 units)	35 (2 units)	120 (2 units)	ongoing	14 (3 units)	34 (3 units)
HF alkylation unit	7	NA	120	43	NA	173	NA	NA
Alkylation	NA	NA	NA	NA	152	NA	16	0
Aromatics	38	<b>0</b>	0	2	124	ongoing	1	5
Visbreaker	0	0	0	17	0	ongoing	0	NA
ARDS-DHC-MHC-unibon	87	<b>4</b>	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Atm storage	21	33	38	35	487	56	0	14
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>387</b>	<b>226</b>	<b>305</b>	<b>310</b>	<b>2067</b>	<b>285</b>	<b>79</b>	<b>109</b>

Very exhaustive (every manual valve is a possible cause)



	POL 1	POL 2	POL 3	POL 4	POL 5	POL 6	POL 7
PP	NA	25	133 (3 units)	809 (7 units)	NA	NA	NA
LDPE	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	439 (2 units)	NA
HDPE	28 (3 units)	1 (1 unit)	21 (1 unit)	NA	NA	NA	NA
PS	NA	16	3	NA	4	23	3

Many scenarios related to environment

# Step 1: Creation of a Major Risk Register

Some observations:


- **Lack of consistency in the number and type** of major accident scenarios reported by different sites for the same types of units:
  - ✓ Some scenarios are **missing**
  - ✓ Some causes were **not treated**
- The **estimation of consequences** is performed using varying approaches
  - ✓ Based on experience of the PHA team
  - ✓ Using different methodologies




# Step 2: List of Generic Major Accident Scenarios for Typical Units



## Inputs



Observation 1: Lack of consistency in the number and type of major accident scenarios reported by different sites for the same types of units






# Step 2: List of Generic Major Accident Scenarios for Typical Units



- Priority was given to process units with **high HAZARD potential**
  - ✓ **HF Alkylation**: isobutane and butene feedstock with as a catalyst toxic HF to produce gasoline component iso-octane: unit with LPG and light products
  - ✓ **Fluid Catalytic Cracker** : feedstock is cracked at high temperature with catalyst into light products
  - ✓ **Poly-propylene unit**: feedstock is propylene
  - ✓ **Naphtha-Cracker**: naphtha, butane or ethane as feedstock , products are LPG and light products
- The analysis includes
  - ✓ Identification of **process causes**.
  - ✓ **Non-process causes** are integrated only if specific to the unit (product characteristics, process parameters...).
  - ✓ Typical **barriers** for prevention, mitigation and protection are listed.
  - ✓ **Frequency** estimation was done in a second step to **prioritize** scenarios and barriers

**Observation 1: Lack of consistency in the number and type of major accident scenarios reported by different sites for the same types of units**




# Step 2: List of Generic Major Accident Scenarios for Typical Units

- Estimation of Consequences
  - ✓ **Internal tools and guidelines** are being developed to assure consistency in the estimation of consequences related to the release of flammable and/or toxic substances
  - ✓ **A task force** involving representatives of all branches in TotalEnergies is in charge of developing these guidelines & tools to increase consistency of results
  - ✓ The guidelines and tools include all phases of a consequence calculation
    - Definition of **source terms**
    - **Dispersion** of vapors/gases
    - Estimation of **physical effects** (pressure, heat radiation)
    - **Impact** of physical effects on people, assets, environment



**Observation 2: The estimation of consequences is performed using varying approaches**




# Step 2: List of Generic Major Accident Scenarios for Typical Units

Case study: Generic Scenarios for FCC Units

- The **frequency** was estimated based on simplified part counts based on typical P&ID
- Focus on **“first priority”** scenario according to TotalEnergies (without any barrier installed)
- In total **47 priority generic** scenarios were identified for an FCC unit


Likely					
Unlikely					
Very unlikely					
Extremely unlikely					
Remote					
	Moderate	Serious	Very Serious	Catastrophic	Disastrous



# Step 2: List of Generic Major Accident Scenarios for Typical Units

Example of a scenario sheet for the FCC unit

Scenario nr	N2-Sc15		
Description	Internal damages / fire and major leak on regenerator		
System	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Node 2 : Reaction section</li> <li>* Equipment function : Regenerator</li> <li>* Operation : Normal</li> </ul>		
Cause(s)	RCVS fails to open due to temperature control malfunction		
Sequence of events	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Feed continues to flow to the reactor riser.</li> <li>* Without the catalyst to vaporize and crack the feed, the oil will fill up the riser, overflow into the stripper and soak the catalyst, then enter the regenerator through the spent catalyst slide valve.</li> <li>* Oil burns resulting in extremely high temperature (<math>&gt; 1000^{\circ}\text{C}</math>)</li> <li>* Explosion at stack and shockwave back into the system</li> <li>* Leakage up to major leak</li> <li>* Flammable risk</li> </ul>		
Severity level	Human	Major leak : G4	
	Asset	G4	
	Environment		
Safety barriers	Description	* High temperature alarm on flue gas and Operator action.	* Low DeltaP (PDSLL) across SCSV Safety (PDSLL) will initiate Reactor S/D (stop feeds, close slide valves, steam dispersion in reactor, "inverted regen/reactor DP" and "ESP deenergized")
	Type	Alarm and operator action	SIF
Comments			





# Step 2: List of Generic Major Accident Scenarios for Typical Units


- Total, La Mède, France (9/11/1992)
- Major VCE
- 6 Fatalities





# Step 2: List of Generic Major Accident Scenarios for Typical Units

- Dynamic Approach !
- Including recent events to complete the list with generic scenarios !






# Step 2: List of Generic Major Accident Scenarios for Typical Units

- Case study: Generic Scenarios for a **Polypropylene Unit (PP)**.
- In total **15 priority generic scenarios** were identified


Nr	Central Hazardous Event
1	Medium leak in raw materials pipeline (ethylene, propylene, hydrogen)
2	Pipe rupture of raw materials pipeline (ethylene, propylene, hydrogen)
3	...
4	...
5	...
6	...
7	...
8	...
9	...
10	...
11	...
12	...
13	...
14	...
15	.....





# Step 2: List of Generic Major Accident Scenarios for Typical Units

- Phillips Petroleum, Pasadena, Texas (23 October 1989)
- Major VCE
- 23 Fatalities




*On October 23, 1989, a series of fires and explosions shook Houston Chemical Complex. Twenty-three persons died. They are lost but not forgotten. We cannot and will not forget those whom tragedy hastened away - our loved ones, our fellow workers, our friends. They are gone, but the indelible imprint of their lives remains with us. We mourn their deaths. We celebrate their lives. But most of all, we remember.....*

- Robert Quilantan Alamillo*
- James Edward Allen*
- Albert Eloy Ancr*
- James Henry Campbell, Jr*
- Juan Manuel Garcia*
- Eloy Gonzalez*
- Jose Luis Gonzalez*
- Mark Lloyd Greston*
- Jeffrey Lester Harrison*
- Delbert Lynn Hoskell*
- Scotty Dale Hawkins*
- James Drowens Hubbard*
- Richard Leos*
- William Scott Martin*
- Juan Trejo Medrano*
- James Arthur Nichols*
- Jesse Thomas Northrup*
- Mary Kathryn O' Connor*
- Gerald Galen Pipher*
- Cipriano Rodriguez, Jr*
- Jesse Oscar Trevino*
- Lino Ralph Trujillo*
- Nathan Gene Warner*

# Step 2: List of Generic Major Accident Scenarios for Typical Units

- Case study: **HF Alkylation Unit**
- In total **17 priority generic scenarios** were identified



1	Loss of containment of HF during unloading operation (rupture of hose/unloading line).
2	Loss containment following loss of cooling of the reaction (with continued feed of olefinic C <sub>4</sub> ). All causes for loss of cooling water need to be considered (trip of pump, valves closed, plugging,...). Possibility to have HF in cooling water circuit with rapid corrosion of other exchangers with risk of loss of containment.
3	...
4	...
5	...
6	...
7	...
8	...
9	...
10	...
11	...
12	...
13	...
14	...
15	...
16	...
17	...



## Step 2: List of Generic Major Accident Scenarios for Typical Units


- Philadelphia Energy Solutions (PES) Refinery, Philadelphia (US)
- 21 June 2019
- 750 M\$ property damage
- Release of about 2000 kg of highly toxic hydrofluoric acid (HF) and about 300.000 kg of hydrocarbons



# Step 2: List of Generic Major Accident Scenarios for Typical Units

## Generic Bow Tie Diagrams

- Developed per **equipment type** by a team of **subject matter experts**
- In line with available **design specifications** and allows to **communicate** more easily about major accident scenarios
- Allows to **compare** available design with “optimum” design meeting design specifications
- Possibility to remove non-existing hardware **barriers** and organizational barriers to verify the impact on risk profile
- Drives **consistency and quality** in risk assessment since use of common starting point



# Step 2: List of Generic Major Accident Scenarios for Typical Units

MARISTO

## Major Risk Scenarios in TotalEnergies

### Disclaimer

The information included in this document is obtained from sources believed to be reliable and is based on technical information and experience currently available inside and outside the TOTAL group at the date of the publication of this document. While PSR/HSE/RM recommends reference to or use of its publications by industrial sites of TOTAL, such reference to or use of its publications by TOTAL sites or third parties are purely voluntary and not binding. Therefore, PSR/HSE/RM makes no guarantee of the results and assumes no liability or responsibility in connection with the reference to or use of information or suggestions contained in its publications. PSR/HSE/RM has no control whatsoever as regards, performance or non performance, misinterpretation, proper or improper use of any information or suggestions contained in its publications by any person or entity and HSE PSR/HSE/RM expressly disclaims any liability in connection thereto. Publications of PSR/HSE/RM are subject to periodic review and users are cautioned to obtain the latest edition.

### Use

The intention of this tool is to help in the consistency of the output of risk studies of activities presenting major accident risks Group. The focus is on accident scenarios with a catastrophic or disastrous impact on people, environment or assets according to CR-GR-HSE-301.

The use of the listed typical scenarios and associated preventive and mitigating barriers in this tool should increase the quality of the output of risk analysis studies. The use of this list includes:

- As starting document for Hazard identification and Risk Assessment specific to a new project with major accident potential,
- As a starting document for Hazard identification and Risk Assessment specific to existing units with major accident potential
- As a reference list of scenarios for existing Hazard Identification and Risk assessment studies to identify missing scenarios in units with major accident potential
- As a guideline for the severity estimation of typical scenarios in units with major accident potential
- As a guideline for typical barriers installed on unit with major accident potential

The scenarios listed in this tool are based on the analysis information found in available studies, experience feedback information and discussions with subject matter experts in TOTAL.

### Warnings

This tool is not a replacement for conducting a full Technological Risk Analysis according to principles explained in CR-GR-HSE-301 and GS-GR-HSE-312.

The list does not include scenarios linked to an unsafe isolation of process equipment. For a safe isolation of a piece of equipment, CR-RC-HSE-028 (isolation rules for sources of hazardous substances) refers.


The frequency of the scenarios has been evaluated by available information in the CHARAD 7.1 database, guidelines from TOTAL and experience feedback information.

This study includes the potential risk evaluation (gravity and frequency) in a general context.

Typical prevention and mitigation barriers are proposed and prioritized to reduce the risk to a generally considered safe or reasonable as per TOTAL CR-GR-HSE-301 criteria. However, barriers may be



# Step 2: List of Generic Major Accident Scenarios for Typical Units



# Step 3: Promotion. Get Everybody On Board !

## 1. Promotion by **Major Risk Division** of **Corporate HSE**

- Promotion of guidelines within process safety network
- Yearly corporate **process safety network** meeting for all branches
- **Training** to process safety experts and operational personnel
- Promotion on TotalEnergies **intranet**
- Review in 3-yearly mandatory corporate **audits**

## 2. **Technology experts** of branches promote safe operation within industrial sites:

- Giving training to operation people with chapters dedicated to
  - ✓ The specific risks of a given unit
  - ✓ Emergency procedures
- 6 monthly network meeting for the process engineers, HSE is present



# Step 4: Closing the Gaps

- Provide **feedback** on guidelines to improve development of generic list for other typical units
- Perform **gap analysis** based on guidelines
- Assure incorporation of the generic list of major scenarios in the **5 yearly PHA review** and close the gap
- Yearly **update of the Major Risk Register** for all industrial sites by the Major Risk Division of Corporate HSE
- **Assistance** to industrial sites
  - ✓ To perform the gap analysis
  - ✓ To assure that the 5-yearly PHA study update includes the list of major accident scenarios





# Conclusions

One step closer to the “perfect” Technological Risk Study by

- Development of a **generic list of major accident scenarios** for typical process units, involving experts covering all disciplines in TotalEnergies:
  - ✓ Provides a **list of credible major accident scenarios** based on expert knowledge: best information as we know it today
  - ✓ Provides guidelines for the **consequence estimation** based on expert knowledge and REX: best knowledge of today
  - ✓ Provides typical **barriers** that are installed in similar units
- A **centralized Major Risk Register** is monitoring the yearly improvement
- The Major Risk Register and associated action plans are discussed **up to board level** of the company

# Questions

